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THE DEATH PENALTY AS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION OF LIFE
AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACYt
N. B. Siorrit*
The eighth amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.' The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the use of capital punishment as not violative of
this amendment,' and has never considered whether the use of the death penalty abro-
gates an individual's right to life or privacy. Although a few state courts have considered
whether use of the death penalty unconstitutionally deprives an individual of his right to
life and abrogates his right to privacy, with the exception of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, 3 they have done so without careful analysis. 4
In Commonwealth v. O'Neal, the Massachusetts Court invalidated a capital punishment
statute as violative of the constitutional rights to privacy and life after first finding that the
statute did not violate the eighth amendment. 5 The O'Neal decision suggests that the use
of the death penalty requires scrutiny in addition to the traditional eighth amendment
analysis because death penalty statutes impact upon the constitutional rights to life and
privacy.
This article evaluates the use of the death penalty and considers whether its use
unconstitutionally deprives individuals of their rights to life and privacy. The first section
of the article will review the current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the constitutional
rights, other than the eighth amendment protections against cruel and unusual punish-
ment, implicated in an analysis of the validity of the death penalty. In this section, the
right to life, particularly in the context of the emergent right to end life and the manifest
right to preserve life will be discussed. This section will also explain why these rights are
relevant to an evaluation of the use of the death penalty. Next, the article will review the
Supreme Court's recent analysis of capital punishment under the eighth amendment.
Finally, the article will discuss the standards under the constitutionally based rights to life
and privacy by which the death penalty should also he measured. The three claimed
justifications for the death penalty — deterrence, incapacitation and retribution — will be
separately considered according to the tests specified for the constitutional rights to life
and privacy. It will be submitted that the use of the death penalty does not pass constitu-
tional muster when examined under the standards employed by the Court in evaluating
governmental action in light of the rights to privacy and life.
t Copyright © 1984 Boston College Law School.
* L.L.B. Harvard Law School 1965; B.A. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 1960;
Partner in Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James and Harkavy, Greensboro, North Carolina.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); In re Klemmer, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
3 Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242, 339 N.E.2d 676 (1975).
▪ See, e.g., Glidewell v. State, 663 P.2d 738, 743 (Okla. Grim. App. 1983); State v. Jerrett, 309
N.C. 239, 267; 307 S.E.2d 339, 354 (1983); State v. Hodges, 89 N.M. 351, 353-60, 552 P.2d 787,
789-796 (1976).
• 369 Mass. 242, 243, 339 N.E.2d 676, 677 (1975).
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I. EXPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS RELEVANT TO AN ANALYSIS 01"IllE
DEATH PENALTY
A. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
The Constitution nowhere expressly recognizes a right to privacy. Antecedents of
such a right, however, can be found in Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford,6 a century-old
United States Supreme Court case, and in the relatively recent cases of Griswold v.
Connecticut? and Roe v. Wade , 8 where the Court held that the right of privacy is a
fundamental constitutional right which binds both the federal and state governments.
Yet, as the Court confirmed in Paul v. Davis , 9 the constitutional right to privacy is not
without limits. In Davis, the Court refused to recognize a constitutional right to privacy
under the common law tort of invasion of privacy as applied to defamation.° Although
the dimensions of the right to privacy are not fully developed, the essence of the right was
succinctly stated by justice Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States as the right
"to be left. alone.""
Three principal branches of the constitutional right to privacy may be traced in the
case law. One aspect of the right of privacy, rooted in its first, third, fourth, and fifth
amendment antecedents," protects a person's private thoughts, speech, writings, read-
ings and other received communications from unintended disclosure. 13 The second
protected zone of privacy, derived primarily from the ninth amendment," embraces the
home and family, the marital relationship, procreation, and the rearing and education of
childrenP A third branch of the constitutional right of privacy and the one on which this
discussion focuses relates to an individual's physical integrity and corporeal autonomy.
This kind of privacy has been summarized as "the freedom to care for one's health and person,
freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf."' 6 Some language in
the Court's privacy decisions refers to privacy in more narrow, institutional terms by
6 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
410 U.S. 113 (1973),
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Id. at 712-13.
" 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). Brandeis and Warren had used the same words in their seminal
article, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. RF,V, 193, 205 (1890). As stated in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 443 (1972), privacy is the right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person... ." Id. It 453.
12 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479. 484 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973);
Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945, 971-72 (1977).
13 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (viewing pornographic movies in the
privacy of one's home); Katz v. United States, '389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1968) (engaging in a telephone
conversation in a phone booth).
14 See cases cited supra note 12.
' 5 See, e.g.. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (educating one's children); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (married couple's right to use contraceptives); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (pregnant woman's qualified right to an abortion).
' 6 410 U.S. at 213-14 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis in the original). See generally,
Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial
Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 361 (1979); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
233 (1977); Craven, Personhood• The Right to be Left Alone, 1976 DUKE Li. 699 (1976); Henkin, Privacy
and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974).
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emphasizing the home, family, marriage, and child care." Yet, the early seminal case that
elucidates the concept of familial privacy," and the later decisions extending abortion
rights without regard to spousal and parental interests,' and contraceptive rights without
parental consent 20 make clear that the right of privacy includes individual, personal
autonomy.
These three main branches of the right of privacy have evolved from certain express
constitutional liberties. That aspect of privacy which concerns physical integrity appar-
ently derives from personal substantive due process.21 Both the fifth and fourteenth
amendments erect protections of "life" and "liberty" against governmental interference.22
To restrain a person's movements,23
 to strike or even touch a person," to require a person
to ingest or expel a substance,23 to penetrate a person's body with instruments,26 and
certainly to put a person to death is liberty or life-depriving. As the Supreme Court stated
in Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford," "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own body. . . The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a
cotnpulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow."'"
B. The Constitutional Right to Life
Substantive due process has greatly declined in importance as a standard for evaluat-
ing the regulation of both economics and human rights:" Despite this decline, even in the
economic context, the government is not unrestrained and must not act arbitrarily. 30 The
same is true in the sphere of human rights regulation. Life and liberty are personal rights
which are embraced by the concept of substantive clue process, and formerly claimed
careful judicial scrutiny when affected by governmental action. Jacobson v. Massachusetts
illustrates this careful judicial scrutiny?' The Jacobson Court passed on the state's right to
17 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (right of privacy not extended to right to keep
public records referring to oneself private); Paris Adult Theatre 1 v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1975)
(distinguished between privacy in home and privacy to watch obscene movies in places of public
accommodation").
" Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("Without doubt [libertyl denotes not merely
freedom From restraint ... but also to ... establish a home and bring up children.
1 " Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72, 75 (1976).
" Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977)
21 "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court has determined, in the
Ninth Amendment reservation of rights to the people, . . .." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
(emphasis added).
'2
	
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 14l U.S. 250
(1891).
" Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
" Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1967).
"" Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
" Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70, 772 (1966) (Human dignity and privacy are
"fundamental human interests." "The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value in our
society.").
27 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
z" Botsford , 141 U.S. at 250-51.
29 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
39 See United States Dept of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
746	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 25:743
require submission to smallpox inoculation, and observed that there is "a sphere within
which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the
authority of any human government, especially of any free government existing under a
written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that will." 3 '
Although substantive due process as a standard to measure human rights has been
eclipsed, the constitutional imperative to protect life and liberty has re-emerged in other
forms. The extension to the states of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights is one
example of this re-emergence. The re-emergence that is the focus of this article is the
formulation of a constitutional right to privacy• 33
C. The Emergent Right to End Life
No elaborate proof or sophisticated analysis is required to conclude that the ultimate
deprivation of privacy is the involuntary taking of life. One might have expected that the
initial and most obvious application of this conclusion would be the preservation of life.''
The individual's claimed right to terminate his own life, however, has primarily occupied
the attention of courts and commentators.
Weighty considerations militate against permitting an individual to end his own life.
Foremost among these considerations is the state's interest in preserving life. 33 In addi-
tion, the concepts of the inviolability and protection of life, are bolstered by the constitu-
tional principles of the right to life and privacy. 36 The state also has an interest in
protecting persons from hasty and ill-considered decisions they make when desperate or
in pain.37 One commentator has suggested that permitting patients to die will inevitably
lead to forcing death upon unwilling ones. 38 Finally, there are laws against attempting and
assisting the commission of suicide,39 which are necessarily overturned if self-destruction
32 Id. at 29.
33 Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Corum. L. REV. 1410, 1428 (1974).
34 Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 Pun,. & Puts. AFT. 26, 29 (1976) "The right to
privacy, then, protects the individual's interest in becoming, being, and remaining a person."
Perhaps it is because the constitutionality of the state's death sentence has been considered in terms
of eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment, that the right of privacy analysis has been
given little attention by the courts and commentators.
33 This interest in preserving life is the justification for the anti-snake handling statutes, which
are uniformly upheld, Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 441-42, 164 S.W.2d 972, 973 (1942),
and Hardin v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 23-24, 216 S.W.2d 708, 710 (1948). The same justification is
offered for statutes prohibiting helmetless motorcycling, which have met with mixed results in the
courts. Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1270 (1970).
36 See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 19 n.1, 355 A.2d 647, 652 n.1 (1976) (acknowledges that the
state's interest in preservation of life is constitutionally based).
37 See Note, The Refusal of Lifesaving Medical Treatment vs. The States Interest in the Preservation of
Life: A Clarification of the Interests at Stake, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 85, 109-10 (1980); Lane v. Candura, 6
Mass. App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) (where a patient was allowed to refuse a lifesaving
amputation, while in abnormal mental condition, although possessing minimal legal competence).
" See Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L.
R. 969 (1958). Indeed, the landmark case in this area, In re Quinlan, authorized a guardian to make
the decision to discontinue life support for a comatose patient, whose own willingness or nonwilling-
ness to die could never be known. 70 N.J. at 52, 355 A.2d at 670.
" W. LAFAVE AND A. Sco -rr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 569 (1972). But see in re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 52,
355 A.2d 647, 670 (1976) (attempted suicide offense invalidated by constitutional right of privacy).
Ingenious arguments are advanced to immunize medical personnel from liability for aiding suicide,
including a distinction between "active" and "passive" euthanasia (the latter inexplicably including
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is authorized. Notwithstanding these objections, since the decision in the Quinlan° case,
courts have almost unanimously held that individuals have both the right to refuse
medical treatment and to die:" These cases uphold the right to die, not only for incurably
and terminally ill patients, but also for those who refuse necessary medical care that might
allow years of pain-free life:" Courts have invariably invoked the right of "bodily integ-
rity," one aspect of the constitutional right of privacy, as both justifying and mandating
this result.'
Courts have also considered the right to die as a component of the constitutional
right to privacy in cases involving prison inmates. Traditionally, states jealously guard
their prerogative to impose capital punishment, and death is allowed only in the pre-
scribed time and manner after all the necessary preparations have been made." This
insistence on formality is made particularly clear when a prisoner on death row becomes
mentally incompetent; he is not executed until his mental capacity is restored, for
otherwise he would not fully appreciate the gravity of both crime and punishment 4'
Courts have reacted in mixed fashion to the situation in which a prisoner decides that
he is going to commit suicide. 46 The Georgia Supreme Court has held that a prisoner's
right to privacy includes the ability to starve himself to death." Appellate courts in West
Virginia and New York, however, have held that the starving prisoner's right to privacy
does not outweigh the state's prerogative to preserve his life by force feeding, in order
that he might serve his full sentence. 48 Criticizing the position of the Georgia Supreme
the discontinuation of a life support machine), which would not pass muster under common law
homicide principles. See Brown and Truit, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 3 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 615
(1976).
° In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
41 See cases cited infra note 43.
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 377-78, 376 N.E.2d 1223, 1232 (1978) (compe-
tent woman had right to refuse life-saving amputation); Sats v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 164 (Fla.
Dist. App. 1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 283 A.2d 785, 787 (1978) (man had
right to refuse amputation when it would not have enhanced quality of life); Supt. of Belchertown v.
Sakewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (right to refuse chemotherapy which
might prolong life); In re Yeatter, 62 Pa. D.& C.2d 619, 623 (1973) (right to refuse surgery which may
prolong life); Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (1962) (adult had right to refuse transfu-
sion even if it resulted in death). Among the many commentaries, mostly favorable to these decisions
are Richards, Constitutional Privacy, the Right to Die and the Meaning Of Life, 22 Wm. & MARY I,. REV.
327 (1981); Note, The Right of Privacy and the Terminally-Ill Patient: Establishing the Right to Die, 31
MERCER L. REV. 603 (1980); Note, The Refusal of Life-Saving Medical Treatment vs. the State's Interest in
the Preservation of Life: A Clarification of the Interests at Stake, 58 WAsit. U.L.Q. 85 (1980); Horan, The
"Right to Die": Legislative and Judicial Developments, 13 FORUM 488 (1978); Note, The Legal Aspects of the
Right to Die: Before and After the Quinlan Decision, 65 Ky. L.J. 823 (1977); Delgado, Euthanasia
Reconsidered — The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 474 ( 1975).
" 24 C. IS. Criminal Law § 1613 (1961).
" See cases collected in Annot., 49 A.E.R. 804 (1977).
4" Apart from violent suicide which prison guards are watchful to prevent, the two most
common ways for a prisoner to commit suicide are to stop eating and to give up appealing his
conviction and sentence. In some European countries where, before the recent abolition of the death
penalty, executions were very rare, and where the guards must be less vigilant than they are in the
United States, about 20% of all murderers committed suicide. M. WOLFGANG AND F. FERRACUTI, THE
SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE (1967).
" Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 834, 286 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (1982). The prisoner had formerly
been under a death sentence.
" State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 58-59 (W.Va. 1982); Von Hoiden v. Chapman, 87
A.2d 66, 69-70, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982). See Note, Constitutional Law — Forced Feeding of a Prisoner on
a Hunger Strike: A Violation of an Inmate's Right of Privacy, 61 N.C.L. REV. 714 (1983).
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Court, the West Virginia court observed that for a state to permit an inmate to kill himself
based on his ability under the right of privacy to refuse medical treatment for voluntary
debilitation, made little sense if the state simultaneously reserved to itself the right to
execute the prisimer." The West Virginia court labelled this state action the "ultimate
violation of [the prisoner's] privacy rights."'" This court further stated that "we doubt that
Georgia would allow [an inmate] to raise his right of privacy against being put to death, as
a defense against the death penalty.'
Another way for an inmate to facilitate his own death involves abandoning post-
appellate discretionary appeals. Most states with death penalties have statutes providing
for automatic appeals. 52 This process uniformly has been held to be nonwaivable by the
delendant.53 The Supreme Court has determined, however, that a death row inmate has
the right to abandon post-appellate discretionary review of his case even if apparently
meritorious grounds exist for such a review. 54 Like any other prisoner, a prisoner on
death row should possess all constitutional rights which are not inconsistent with the
institutional requirements of lawful incarceration." Exercising the right of privacy to
choose death by starvation or to accelerate death by forfeiting appeals does not demonstr-
ably interfere with the institutional concerns of security and good order.56 If the right of
privacy confers on a free person the right to end his Own life, then this right should also
belong to the condemned prisoner.' 7
C. The Manifest Right to Preserve Life
The constitutional right to privacy protects the right to end one's own life despite
serious countervailing considerations. Likewise, fully as much recognition should be
granted to the right to preserve life. The right to life derives from the "irreducible
perception that life and the organic base on which it subsists are somehow sacred. It is .
'the primordial experience of being alive, of experiencing elemental sensation of vitality
and of fearing its extinction' that generates the sense of sanctity that attaches to the living
49 State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d. 54, 57 (W.Va. 1982).
so Id.
al Id,
52 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(1) (Michie 1978).
93 GoOde v. State, 365 So.2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1978); People v. Stanworth, 71 Ca1.2d 820, 832-33,
457 P.2d 889, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 58-59 (1969). See Note, The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate
Decision, 54 So. CAL. I.. REV. 575 (1980).
" Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725, 725 (1980); Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 987, vacating stay of
execution, 440 U.S. 1301 (1979).
52 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974), Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
413 (1974).
56 Two courts, however, have held otherwise. Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450
N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982) (strikes by inmates violate the prison's duty to "protect life of prisoners");
Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979) (state may force
prisoner to accept dialysis because of the state's interest in maintaining orderly prisons).
Most death penalty abolitionists support the right to refuse medical treatment, but take a
seemingly inconsistent position in opposition to permitting condemned prisoners to choose death.
See supra note 53. These abolitionists are of the opinion that even one more execution will make it
easier for executions to become routine. H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THF: CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL.
PUNISHMENT 122-23 (1977). It is interesting to note that the few executions which took place between
1967 and 1979 were Of prisoners who gave up their appeals and expressed a desire to die.
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human being."." The weighty countervailing considerations that those wishing to die must
overcome are not applicable when one seeks to preserve life. Preservation of life, as
opposed to its destruction, advances rather than defeats the state's interest in preserving
life. in addition, when the goal is the preservation of life, there is a greatly diminished risk
of hasty and ill-considered decisions because a decision to continue living can be reversed
at any time. Finally, preservation of life does not require that the criminal law be
abrogated — allowing an individual to live is not a crime.m1 The constitutional right of
privacy is a powerful bulwark for the preservation of life.
The right to preserve life as either a component of the right of privacy or as a matter
of substantive due process, has received little attention from the courts. The reason
apparently lies in certain historical developments of the governmental branches. From
the nadir of substantive due process in the 1930's until the pronouncement of the right of
privacy in the 1960's the federal courts were without constitutional principles with which
to analyze right to life claims 6 0 During the same period, however, Congress and the
Executive Branch engaged in activity of unprecedented scale to eliminate common
threats to life, by providing food, housing, medical care and other basic necessities of
those in need,'" In fact, by the 1960's, the political branches had essentially granted
Americans the "freedom from want" first proclaimed by President Roosevelt," and the
courts' task was limited largely io interpreting and enforcing the laws on these subjects. 63
By the time the Supreme Court recovered its capacity to define the right to life, the
political branches had pre-empted the field and the need for the courts to intervene had
disappeared. If the political branches fail to provide for life-sustaining needs, however,
the hope is that the courts will define the right to life as an element of the right to privacy
and as a matter of due process to include the right of each person to be provided with
life's basic necessities.
In upholding the constitutional interest of preserving life, ordaining that the gov-
ernment shall not kill those who want to live is a much easier matter than requiring that
the government take positive steps to preserve life. The government's active role in
killing, therefore, becomes the focal point. Some federal courts have directly addressed
claims of a right to life. This issue is raised initially when deadly force is used to
apprehend those suspected of committing nondangerous felonies. Many jurisdictions
have adopted statutes allowing police to use deadly force only where a violent felony has
been committed or where the suspect is armed and likely to endanger others." A number
of jurisdictions continue to allow police to shoot at fleeing suspects whose crimes are
nonviolent and who pose no immediate danger to others. 63 The Fourth, Sixth and Eighth
Circuits have condemned the latter position, holding that such police conduct violates a
38 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-12, at 938 (1978), citing Shils, The Sanctity of
Life, ENCOUNTER, Jan. 1967 at 39.
" See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
6° See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61 This governmental activity began with the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), and the
National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
61 BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 920 (13th Ed. 1955) (Message to Congress, Jan. 6 1941).
63 In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court ignored an opportunity to declare
that food and shelter are among the fundamental rights protected by the constitution. See id. at 522
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLum. L. REV. 1410, 1419 (1974).
84 E.g., N.C.G.S.15A-401(d) (2)b; Model Penal Code § 3.02(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962).
65 See cases collected Annot., 83 A.L.R. 3d 174, 208-12 (1978).
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suspect's fourteenth amendment right to life. 66 In condemning the practice of shooting
fleeing felons regardless of the circumstances, the Sixth Circuit refused to follow its own
recent cases which held that such police conduct did not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment.67
 The court distinguished these prior eighth amendment cases on the
ground that the newly-raised life or liberty question is a different issue from that raised
under the eighth amendment. Recognition of this distinction is particularly significant to
a comparative analysis of the death penalty under the eighth amendment and under the
constitutionally-based rights to life and privacy, and is discussed in the next section of this
article.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL. PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT: NOT CRUEL. OR UNUSUAL,
Before examining the death penalty in light of the constitutional concepts of privacy
and right. to life, a review of the Supreme Court's recent analysis of capital punishment
under the eighth amendment is necessary. Only two Supreme Court Justices — Brennan
and Marshall — have espoused the view that the death penalty is per se cruel and unusual
punishment."' ID Furman v. Georgia," the Court struck down the death penalty under the
eighth amendment on the grounds of arbitrariness because of the lack of standards to
guide juries in deciding on punishment." Sonic state legislatures responded to the
Furman decision by making the death sentence mandatory for certain crimes, but. these
laws were struck down as arbitrary for failing to consider the unique circumstances of
each crime and the individual defender. 7 ' In Gregg v. Georgia, however, the Court
considered and upheld against eighth amendment challenges the validity of complicated
sentencing schemes by which juries find mitigating and aggravating factors from the facts
of each case and decide from these factors whether to sentence an offender to life
imprisonment or death."
In his opinion for the Court in Gregg, J ustice Stewart focused on the eighth amend-
ment inquiry, taking the essence of his analysis from Trop v. Dulles . 7a Stating that the
eighth amendment" 'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society,' "74 the Court concluded that a form of punish-
" See e.g., Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1983) (principal holding
was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the fourth amendment); Mattis v. Schnar, 547 F.2d 1007,
1019-20 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot sub nom, Ashcraft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 (1977); Jenkins
v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970) (nominally involving fourth amendment to protect an
"individual's physical integrity").
" Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 247-48 (6th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing Wiley v.
West Memphis Police Dep't , 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977)).
" See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257, 306 (Brennan, J., concurring), 314 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 231-41
(Marshall, J., concurring) (1976).
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
1° 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring), 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring), 291-95 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
7 ' See e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (mandatory death sentence
does not provide objective standard).
72
 428 U.S. 153, 199-207 (1976).
13 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (quoted at 428 U.S. at 173).
" 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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merit is not cruel or unusual if it is not offensive to contemporary community N'alnes.
The Gregg Court's eighth amendment analysis limits the review of states' justifications
for the death penalty in three ways. First, the state interests relied upon to support the
penalty need not be demonstrable or provable. Second, a heavy burden is placed upon the
party challenging the correctness of the state's claimed basis. Third, the state is under no
compulsion to use the least severe penalty. 76
The Gregg Court. enumerated deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation as the
interests claimed to be served by the death penalty." Regarding deterrence, none of the
justices in the majority were convinced that capital punishment deters crime, but each
deferred to the states' legislative judgments that the death penalty is a deterrent." The
Gregg Court stated that "[s]tatistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty as
a deterrent to crime by potential offenders have occasioned a great deal of debate. The
results have been inconclusive." 79 Instead of addressing retribution alone as a justification
for the death penalty, the Court presented retribution simply as a variant of deterrence.
The Court stated that "[w]hen people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling
or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there
are sown the seeds of anarchy — of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law."" In the
following discussion of the justifications offered to support the death penalty in light of
the rights to life and privacy, deterrence will assume the greatest importance of these
three justifications.
[II. THE DEATH PENALTY AND Tut: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS To LIFE AND PRIVACY
A. Standards Applicable to the Rights to Life and Privacy
The standards by which the death penalty must be measured under either the
constitutional right to life or the constitutional right to privacy are more exacting than
n Justice Stewart stated that "an assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction of
a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the eighth amendment.... It requires ... that
we look to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction," 428 U.S. at 173.
Justice Stewart also concluded that the eighth amendment requires an inquiry as to whether a
particular punishment is barbarous, grossly disproportionate to the offense committed or contrary to
human dignity. 428 U.S. at 170-73. Justice Stewart also cited public opinion polls showing shifting
majority expressions in favor of the death penalty. Id. at 181 and n. 25.
" The Gregg Court stated:
[W]e may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as
the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved.
And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the representa-
tives of the people.
This is true in part because the constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment
of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining
such standards.
428 U.S. at 175.
" 428 U.S. at 183 & n.28.
" Id. at 184-85
-a) Id. at 175. A few lines later in the opinion, however, and without citing supporting evidence of
authority, Justice Stewart stated that - the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent.. . ."
Id. at 185-86. In Furman, Chief justice Burger had found the evidence of deterrence either stale-
mated or inconclusive. 408 U.S. at 395. In the same decision, Justice Powell observed that studies
tended to support the view that the death penalty is not a superior deterrent. 908 U.S. at 454 - 55.
" 428 U.S. at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308(1972)). Justice Marshall notes
this as nothing more than deterrence mislabelled. 428 U.S. at 237-39.
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those standards that apply to the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Because the right to privacy is fundamental, restrictions on it are "justified only by a
'compelling state interest,' ... and [if] legislative enactments [are] narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake. "8t No cases have held that the four-
teenth amendment right to life alone is fundamental when viewed apart from the modern
right of privacy. While the Supreme Court has hesitated to denominate previously
unlabelled rights as "fundamental" in recent years, life itself is plainly a basic and essential
right, and the Court would have difficulty in plausibly declaring life to he less than
fundamental. The substantive due process cases decided before rights were labelled
"fundamental" or non-fundamental reveal, however, a far greater deference than the
deference accorded under the eighth amendment analysis employed in Gregg. 82 For
example, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts as the Supreme Court upheld the states' right to
compel individuals to submit to smallpox vaccination."' The Jacobson Court, in upholding
the state's position, observed that the state action in question was "necessary for the public
health or the public safety.""
Assuming that the right to life is fundamental, the three claimed justifications for the
death penalty — deterrence, incapacitation and retribution — will be separately
scrutinized using the tests specified for the constitutional rights to life and privacy. The
inquiry under these tests is two part. First, the test requires a determination whether a
compelling state interest or a necessity on grounds of public health and safety exists to
exact the death penalty. Second, the test requires a determination whether a lesser
penalty would adequately serve the states' claimed interest. Unlike an eighth amendment
analysis, under an analysis grounded on the constitutional rights to life and privacy, the
burden of proof is on the state and not the accused. Under the latter analysis, if an
evaluation of the evidence in a particular case leads only to a speculative conclusion, the
state's claimed justification must be rejected."
B. Deterrence
Deterrence is by far the most important claimed justification for the death penalty. 87
The intuitive belief that capital punishment would be abolished if it became widely
5 ' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Accord, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 (1968)
(no greater invasion of privacy than is necessary under the circumstances).
92 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
fa 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). Even so, the Jacobson Court made it clear that the law had not been
interpreted "[to establish] the absolute rule that an adult must be vaccinated if it he apparent or can
be shown with reasonable certainty that he is not at the time a fit subject of vaccination, or that
vaccination, by reason of his then condition, would seriously impair his health or probably cause his
death." 197 U.S. at 39. The significance this reservation has for capital punishment cases is readily
apparent
'el Id. at 27.
M Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
8° The following analysis by Van der Haag would be satisfactory for eighth amendment pur-
poses, but is wrong in terms of the constitutional rights to privacy and life:
[T]he statistics ... show only that there is no statistical proof for the deterrent effect of
the death penalty. But they do not show that there is no deterrent effect. Not to
demonstrate presence of the effect is not the same as to demonstrate its absence;
certainly not when there are plausible explanations for the nondemonstrability of the
effect. It is on our uncertainty that the case for deterrence must rest." Van der Haag,
On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, in E'rnics AND PUBLIC POLICY 73, 103-04 (T.
Beauchamp ed. 1975).
87 See infra note 89.
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realized that the death penalty does not deter punishment is commonly held." Opinion
polls consistently disclose that a very high percentage of death penalty supporters believe
it is a deterrent, and a very low percentage of capital punishment opponents regard it as a
deterrent." Justice Stewart's discussion of retribution in Gregg a. Georgia was simply a
thinly disguised argument for deterrence." Although he acknowledged that evidence on
deterrence is inconclusive, be concluded without explanation that "the death penalty
undoubtedly is a significant deterrent.. ." 91
A considerable body of statistical evidence on the relationship between executions
and homicide is available. This evidence will be examined to determine whether a
compelling state interest or necessity on the grounds of public health or safety exists to
justify the death penalty. Sellin has done a cross sectional study of comparative homicide
rates in states that had abolished capital punishment and neighboring states which were
similar in population composition and economic and social conditions that had retained it.
Fie found no statistically significant difference in the murder rate. 92 Support for Sellin's
results is found in "longitudinal" studies of murder rates in jurisdictions before and after
abolition of the death penalty 93 Sellin's work, however, is justifiably criticized for the
quality of the data used, especially since risk of execution was essentially nil in the
retentionist states used for comparison."
In contrast to Sellin's approach, Ehrlich's first work was a time study of the nation as a
whole, which examined the relationship between homicide rates and execution risk 95 for
the years 1933 to 1969. By applying a multiple regression analysis to control selected
variables, he found a negative relationship between the homicide rate and the existence of
the death penalty, that is, he found fewer homicides when there were more executions.
Ehrlich suggested that one additional execution "may" have resulted in the average of
seven or eight fewer murders." This work, however, has been sharply criticized on five
"" Id
"" Two polls reveal 76% and 93% of death penalty supporters believe capital punishment deters,
and 29% and 8% of death penalty opponents believe it is a deterrent. Vidman arid Ellsworth, Public
Opinion on the Death Penalty, 26 STANFoRn L. REV. 1245 (1974). See also Thomas, Eighth Amendment
Challenges to the Death Penalty: The Relevance of Informed Public Opinion, 30 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1005
(1977).
9° See supra note 80 and accompanying teat. But see SpaAiano v, Florida, 52 U.S.L.W. 5030, 5034
(1984) ("[T]he primary justification for the death penalty is retribution.").
91 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 185-86.
"2 T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY 21-34 (1959); Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionists
States, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 135 (T, Sellin ed. 1967); Sellin, Capital Punishment, 25 Fin. PROBATION
3 (1961). A cross sectional study is an analysis of observations on variables at a point in time, as
distinguished from a time study which deals with observations covering several time periods. INT.
ENCYCL. STATISTIC.S 91.
Baldus and Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Issac Ehrlich on the Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE. L.J. 359, 364-65 (1965).
" Either no or very few executions were carried out in the comparison states. Ehrlich, Deter-
rence.- Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE 209, 222-23 (1975); Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 VALE L.J. 359, 364-65 (1975).
"' The "execution risk" is the fraction of persons convicted of murder who are subsequently
executed.
96 Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life or Death, 65 YALE L.J. 397,
414 (1975). A single regression analysis tests the linear relationship of a single random variable to
other fixed or non-random variables ; whereas a multiple regression analysis employs either more
than one random variable or tests a polynomial rather than a linear relationship. INT. LNCYCL.
STATISTICS 523, 529.
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grounds. First, the use of nationwide statistics obscured relationships of murder and
execution rates between abolitionist and retentionist jurisdictions." Second, the variables
for the regression analysis were arbitrarily chosen and while some of the assumptions
about their relevancy are testable, none have actually been tested." Third, the correlation
between homicide rate and execution risk becomes slightly positive" when the last five
years, are removed, indicating that structural changes may have taken place between the
earlier and later years that would render the statistical model inappropriate.'w Fourth,
logarithmic rather than natural forms of variables are used, resulting in emphasis on
variations at lower ranges of variables. 10 ' Fifth, qualitatively better data for homicide rates
are available beginning in 1940.' 02
Yunker used techniques similar to those of 'Ehrlich to study experience from the
years 1960 to 1972.'" He concluded that a single execution could deter 156 murders.'"
Yonkers work, however, is also seriously flawed. By selecting a period when executions
declined and murders rose, he tailored his data to the result desired. 10 ' He admitted his
analysis might contain many technical biases, but did not attempt to correct them or to test
alternative specifications. Moreover, he did not use a variety of tests with alternate
equations and different variables, as Ehrlich did; instead, he used a single variable.
Further, he used a three year lag between homicides and executions, whereas nonlagged
rates reveal no statistically significant relationship.'"
9r
	and Cole, supra note 93, at 179
9"
	
Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: a Cross
-state Analysis of the 1960's, 61 MINN.
L. REV. 743, 746 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Forst]; Baldus and Cole, A Comparison of the Work of
Thorsten Sellin and Issac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 VALE L.J. 170, 183-84
(1975). See also J. JonNsoN, EcoNomErkic Mrritoos 169, 244 (2d ed. 1972). Without these variables
there would have been a positive simple correlation between homicide rate and execution risk, that is,
more homicides when there were more executions. See generally, Erhlich, supra note 96, at 409
(supplying and explaining proper formulae).
" A positive correlation between homicide rate and execution risk is consistent with counter-
deterrence.
''") Klein, Forst and Filatov, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment.. An Assessment of Estimates, in
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION; ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS Or CRIMINAL. SANCTIONS Or CRIME 26-28
(A. Blumstein ed. 1977); The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV.
445 (1977); Peck, supra note 94, at 361. See generally, Bowers and Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in
Issac Ehrlich's Research of Capital Punishment, 85 VALE L.,[. 187, 197-99, 201-04 (1975) (These last five
years were very atypical in that no executions took place, anti the homicide rate rose substantially).
1° ' Using logarit h mic forms of variables, the difference between two executions per 1,000
convictions is greater than a difference between 350 and 650 executions per 1,000 convictions. This
technique has the effect of accentuating the decline in executions in the late 1960's. Bowers and
Pierce, supra note 100, at 749-50; Wolfgang and Ferracuti, supra note 46. •
' 12 During the 1930's, the Federal Bureau of Investigation figures did not coincide with those of
the Bureau of Census, although they later did. if one ends the study in 1963 and begins it in 1940 (or
even 1938 or 1939) there is a positive, rather than a negative, coefficient for execution risk in each
case. Bowers and Pierce, supra note 100. 85 YALE at 203- 05. Criticisms of Ehrlich's work are
summarized in justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153. 235-36
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 °3 Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent for Homicide? Some Time Series Evidence, 5,J. BEI1 AVORIAL
ECON. 45-81 (1976).
i 0' Id. at 65.
1 °0 McGahey, Dr. Ehrlich's Magic Bullet: Economic Theory, Econometrics and the Death Penalty, 26
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 485, 493 (1980) [hereinafter cited as McCahey]; Bailey, An Analysis of the
Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 10 N.C. CENTRAL. L.J. 29. 33 - 34 (1977).
1" Nonlagged rates were simply the rates of homicides and executions occurring in the same
year.
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Ehrlich, responding to criticism of his earlier work, did a combined cross sectional
analysis and time study of a number of states.'" He chose the period 1940 to 1950 on the
ground that the level of enforcement of capital punishment in executing states was
sufficiently high and variable during that decade.'" He found a negative correlation
between homicide and execution rate, consistent with the deterrence hypothesis.'" While
most of the flaws identified in Ehrlich's first study were eliminated in the second work, a
serious problem has been identified in the latter. The problem concerned the use of a
"dummy" variable, which distinguished executing from nonexecuting states, 16 Only
when this dummy variable is included in the same equation with the execution risk does
the deterrent effect appear."'
Bailey has done two types of studies. The first was a series of investigations of' single
states— North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and California — over periods beginning 1910 to
1918 and ending in 1962.' 12 Using a multiple regression analysis like Ehrlich's, he found
relationships in most instances that were not statistically significant, and in a few instances
positive or counter-deterrent relationships. When Bailey applied his analysis to the nation
as a whole, however, his results were different." 3
 His multivariant cross-sectional analysis
of nationwide execution rates and homicide rates for 28 years within the period 1910 to
1962, with selected socio-demographic factors held constant —. percent urban, nonwhite,
and unemployment; median family income; education — revealed a negative effect
consistent with deterrence in 71% of the years, and a positive effect consistent with
counter-deterrence in 25% of the years."' Bailey's inconsistent findings are explained by
Wasserman, who discovered that the correlation supporting deterrence holds in only 12
states of the Deep South and Northern industrial region which had carried out a large
number of executions during the study period.'" In view of the relatively high correlation
of certain socio-economic criteria with the murder rate, Wasserman is of the opinion that
1 °7 Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J.
POLITICAL ECONOMY 741, 748-49 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ehrlich].
Id. at 742. The variables used were urban crime rate, homicide rate, probability of conviction
generally and for murder in particular, median time spent in prison by all offenders prior to first
release, ratio of executions to convictions, median family income, percent of families below one-half
median family income, percentage of nonwhites, percentage in age groups 15-24 and 29-34, and
percentage of urban population. Id. at 750.
1 °9 Ehrlich, supra note 107, at 751, 778.
' 1 ° McGahey, supra note 105 at 497.
'" Id. The dummy variable is a constant used as a device for computation of the discriminant
function (combination of measures used to make assignments to groups). INT. ENCYCL. STATISTICS
628, 632.
to See Bailey, supra note 105; Bailey, An Analysis of the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty in
Oregon, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 67 (1979); Bailey, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty for Murder in
Ohio: A Time-Series Analysis, 28 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 51 (1979); Bailey, The Deterrent Effect of the Death
Penalty for Murder in Califormia , 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 743 (1979). In response to questions raised about
his statistical techniques, he reanalyzed the data using the least-square regression procedure, and
came up with the same results. Bailey, Some Further Evidence on Imprisonment vs. the Death Penalty as a
Deterrent to Murder, 2 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 245 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bailey].
113 Bailey, A Multivariate Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, 64
SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 183 (1980). Multivariant analysis is the summarization, representa-
tion and interpretation of data when more than one characteristic of each sample unit is measured.
INT. ENCYGL. STATISTICS 604. See supra note 92 for definition of cross sectional study.
14 Id. at 201-02.
" 5 Wasserman, Non-Deterrent Effects of Executions on Homicide Rates, 48 PSYCH. RETORTS 137
(1981).
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economic and demographic shifts, rather than execution risk, are responsible for the
homicide rate."
In contrast to the studies that appear to provide support for the deterrence theory,
the results in recent studies by Forst,'" Knorr ," 8 Bechdolt," 9 Boyles & McPheters" 9
Lempert,"' Passell, 122 and Black & Orsagh' 23 are inconsistent with the deterrence theory.
For example, Forst did both time series and cross sectional analysis for the period 1960 to
1970. 12 ' He employed a regression analysis with a model including several variables,' 2 '
and used various accepted statistical tests for the purposes of finding inconsistencies and
anomalies, including the variant of a one-year time lag between conviction and execu-
tion.' 26 Forst found that execution rate was not a statistically significant variable with
homicide rate, but that poverty, median family income, race, other crime rate, and
conviction rate were related with statistical significance. 127 He also found that the results
were consistent with a generalized study of the entire nation for the same decade.""
Knorr also employed a statistically eclectic approach, analyzing data from the period
1950 to 1960. 129 He combined time series and cross sectional analyses into a pooled cross
sectional time series analysis, with socio-economic variables held constant.' 3° Knorr sepa-
rately studied the nation as a whole, various geographic regions, and the individual
states."' He chose the 1950's as the study period because a sufficiently wide variety of
demographic data did not exist for earlier years, and there were not enough executions
after 1960 to extend the study beyond that date.'" The results were uniformly inconsis-
tent with the deterrence theory.'"
Bechdolt's time series and cross sectional analyses found no significant relationship
"S
IL? Forst, supra note 98.
"" Knorr, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Temporal Cross-Sectional Approach, 70 J. CRIM. LAW &
CRIMINOLOGY 235 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Knorr].
"" Bechdolt, Capital Punishment and Homocide and Rape Rates in the United States: Time Series and
Cross Sectional Regression Analyses, 6 J. BEnAv. ECON. 33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bechdolt].
12° Boyles and McPheters, Capital Punishment as a Deterrent to Violent Crime: Cross Sectional
Evidence, 61 BEHAV. EcoN. 67 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Boyles and McPheters).
121 Lampert, The Effect of Executions on Homicides: A New Look in an Old Light, 29 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 88 (1983) [hereinafter cited as LaMperII.
"3 Passell, The Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. Rev. 61 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Passell].
"3 Black & Orsagh, New Evidence on the Efficacy of Sanctions as a Deterrent to Homocide, 58 Soc. Sc,.
QUARTERLY 616 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Black & Orsagh].
"4 Forst, supra note 98, at 751.
'' These variables were age, race, sex, resident populations, urbanization, school enrollment
rate, divorce rate, median family income, rate at which other crimes were committed, proportion of
families living in poverty and whether the state is Southern, as well as homicide rate, conviction rate,
execution rate, and average prison time. F'orst.supra note 98, at 751. See supra note 96 for definition
of "regression analysis."
1 " Id. at 755-61.
127 Id. at 754.
"" Forst, supra note 98, at 747-51, 762.
'" Knorr, supra note 118.
' 30 Id. at 247-51. Pooling time series and cross sectional studies is a means by which their
inter-relationships can be analyzed. See INT. ENcvci.. STATISTICS 555. For definitions of these terms
see supra note 96.
' 3 ' Id. at 247-51.
'" Id. at 247-48.
"3 Id. at 249-53.
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between the homicide rate and execittions.' 34 Similar studies by Black & Orsagh,' 35 Boyles
& McPheters,'" and Passe11 137 are also inconsistent with the deterrence hypothesis. Lem-
pert, following Sellin's approach but taking Ehrlich's criticisms into account., compared
states on the basis of murderers executed, correlating differences in executions and
homicide rates. He also found no reason to conclude that executions deter homicides. 13 "
In addition to the results of statistical analyses, common sense dictates that the death
penalty as presently administered is not a deterrent. Even today when capital punishment
has been restored in a majority of states in forms of which the Supreme Court approves,
death sentences are rarely Unposed.'" Still more rarely do these sentences withstand
appellate and collateral review."° To believe that a person contemplating murder would
feel substantially threatened by the statistical likelihood that he or she would receive t he
death penalty goes against the dictates of common sense."' In fact, the Supreme Court
itself has given the hypothetical "thoughtful" potential killer the blueprint for a perfect
crime, if that person's sole objective is to escape the death penalty. In Godfrey v. Georgia , 142
the Court struck down a death sentence after carefully reviewing the circumstances of the
crime, holding that the death penalty should be reserved only for the particularly
heinous, atrocious murderer. According to the Godfrey Court's reasoning, if the murder is
committed humanely, painlessly, and without warning, though probably not for hire, the
death penalty could not be imposed on the murderer 13
As the foregoing discussion indicates, neither a "compelling" showing nor a demon-
stration of "necessity" that the death penalty deters homicide has been made. To the
contrary, a significant possibility exists-that the greater frequency of capital punishment is
associated with a rise in the homicide rate. A recent study by Bowers and Pierce is
illustrative.'' These researchers analyzed the executions of offenders and the number of
homicides in New York State from 1907 to 1963 to determine how the number of
homicides per month was affected by the executions of the preceding year.]'' Multiple
regression techniques were used with controls for seasonal variations in the homicide rate
and exogenous factors."4 The researchers found that, on the average, there were two
additional homicides during the month following an executic.m." 1
'34 Bechdolt, supra note 119, at 57-64.
135 Black and Orsagh, supra note 123, at 626-30.
' 36 Boyles and Mci'heters, .supra note 120, at 83.
' 37 Passel], supra note 122, at 78-80.
'" Lampert, supra note 121, at 114-115.
139
 Even before Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the death sentence was rarely imposed.
Percentages of homicides resulting in executions in the 1910's were 2.3%; 1920's — 1.5%; 1930's —
3.6%; 1940's — 1.7%; 1950's — .8%; 1960's — .4%. W. J. Bowers, Executions in America 36 (1974).
14° W. J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital
Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRimixot.ocv 1067, 1090-98 (1984).
See Jones and Potter, Deterrence, Retribution, Denunciation and the Death Penally, 49 UM KC L.
REV. 158, 160- 161 (1980).
'" 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
' 43 Id. at 432-33.
'44 Bowers and Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization; What is the Effect of Execution? 26 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 453 (1980).
3 " Id. at 469
146 Id. at 470
' 47 Id. at 481
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Other studies have provided results similar to those of Bowers and Pierce. For
example, Savitz studied homicides in Philadelphia eight weeks before and idler the
imposition of four well publicized death sentences."' When seasonally adjusted, the study
indicates that five more murders occurred than would have been expected, or, 1.25 per
death sentence, in the eight weeks following the executions. 149
 King found that there were
1.8 more homicides in South Carolina in the month after a press story recounting an
execution than in the preceding month." Graves reported that during the years 1946 to
1955, when California carried out executions on Fridays, more murders were committed
on Thursdays and Fridays during weeks when there were executions than were commit-
ted on other weekdays.''' Dann noted that 113 murders were reported in the 60 days
following five highly publicized executions, as compared with 91 murders in the 60 days
preceding the executions.'" An explanation of this phenomenon may be found in the
desire some people have to be executed. Supporting this explanation are case studies of
killers who insisted that they committed murder to be executed."3
 This desire is a
recognized psychological phenomenon. As Justice Brandeis stated in his dissent in
Olmstead v. United States, "[ojur Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill it teaches the whole people by its example.'
The studies discussed above demonstrate that deterrence does not provide the
compelling state interest necessary for the death penalty to be upheld when analyzed
under the constitutional right of privacy. In addition, deterrence does not satisfy the less
restrictive means test used in cases involving the constitutional right of privacy. That is,
less restrictive means such as imprisonment for life or for a lengthy term will satisfy the
same need as does the death penalty: Investigations by Forst, Ehrlich, Glaser and
Bailey are of significance on this point. In his time series and cross sectional analyses of
homicide rates and execution risks during the period 1960 to 1970, Forst found that one
of the two most inH uential factors in the rising homicide rate was the decline in the rate at
which homicide offenses resulted in imprisonment.'" After evaluating various empirical
studies, Glaser concluded that a negative association existed between homicide rate and
long prison terms." In states where murder rates were lowest, therefore, median sen-
' 48 L. Savitz, A Study in Capital Punishment, 49 .j. CRIM. LAW, CRIMINAL. & POLICE Set. 339 (1958).
"" Id. at 341.
18° King, The Brutalizing Effect: Execution, Publicity and the Incidence of Homicide in South Carolina,
SOCIAL FORCES 683 (1978).
181 Graves, A Doctor Looks at Capital Punishment, 10 MED. ARTS & Sci. 137, reprinted in H. Bedau,
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 322 (1964). The excedence was sufficiently large to have had only a
5% likelihood of resulting from chance.
1" Dann, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 29 FRIENDS SOC. SCI. BULL. 1 (1935).
I"
 H. MATTICK, THE UNEXAMINED DEATH (1966); H. VON WEBER, SELBSTMORD ALS MORDMOTIV,
MONATSSCH RIFT FUR KRIM INALBIOLOCIC UND STRAFRECHTSREFORM 161 (1937).
"4 277 U.S. 438, 487 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
'" The rate declined from 41.3% in 1960 to 34.6% in 1970. Forst, supra note 98 at 762. The
other factor was increasing affluence — the homicide rate rose more in states that had the greatest
increases in wealth. Ford's results on the relationship between incarceration and the murder rate
were consistent with those of the studies by Ehrlich, supra note 96 at 410-411, and Passell, supra note
122, at 69-71.
Ise
	 Capital Punishment 
— Deterrent or Stimulus to Murder? Our Unexamined Deaths and
Penalties, 10 U . TOLEDO L. REV. 317, 327, and Table 3 (1978). Ehrlich's figures are to the contrary,
except that by 1960 states which seldom executed but still had capital punishment on the books, had
achieved lengthier average prison terms than the executing states; supra note 107, at 773-77.
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tences before parole for willful homicide were the longest and vice versa.'' The rise in the
murder rate from 1960 to 1975 is apparently related to the decline in the median years of
murder sentences served until release.' Both Ehrlich and Bailey found that severity of
prison sentences had a deterrent effect on homicide rates, the latter concluding that this
factor is a better predictor of homicides than execution risk.' 59 The foregoing studies
reveal that the certainty of punishment and the relative severity of prison sentences are
more effective deterrents than the death penalty.
Other means of reducing the murder rate, more effective than capital punishment,
which do not invade an individual's right of privacy may be considered. One alternative to
the death penalty would be to expend more police and prosecutorial resources to Secure
higher arrest and conviction levels. Both arrest and conviction levels have been f ound to
have a deterrent effect on homicicle.m Another means to deter homicide is to reduce
unemployment, Ehrlich concluded that a 1% change in labor force participation would
have a much greater tendency to lower the homicide rate than a 10% increase in the use
of capital punishment.'" Bailey and Bechdolt found in their respective studies that there
was a far greater correlation between the unemployment rate and the homicide rate than
between the latter and the risk of execution,' 62
C. Incapacitation
The second claimed justification for capital punishment is incapacitation, sometimes
referred to as disablement or specific deterrence. Execution eliminates the possibility that
a killer will kill again. The rate of recidivism among paroled or imprisoned capital
offenders, however, is extremely low. 163 As Justice Marshall observed in his dissent in
Gregg v. Georgia, life imprisonment, and solitary confinement if necessary, would fully
incapacitate, 1 °" In a system where life imprisonment or very long sentences are assured
for murder convictions, the extremely unlikely possibility that a convicted murderer
would kill again negates either a "compelling state interest" or a necessity that. capital
punishment be invoked. Thus, a life sentence is the least drastic remedy effective for
reducing the threat. to the community which results from short or nonactivc sentences in
homicide cases,'
'" Glaser, .supra note 156, at 327 and Table 3.
1" Id.
1" Ehrlich, supra note 107 at 771; Bailey, supra note 113, at 198.
1" Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 67 Am. ECON. Rev. 452. 455 (1977). Ehrlich
found the conviction rate to be a variable affected by the execution rate. He acknowledged that the
conviction rate is likely to decline as the execution rate increases on account of jury reluctance to
impose capital punishment. If a I% increase in executions were to result in more than a .175%
decrease in convictions, the deterrence he projected in his first study would have been eliminated.
Ehrlich,supra note 96; 65 AM. Ecosr. REY. at 405. See also Passel! and Taylor, supra note 100; Knorr,
supra note 118 (arrest rate significantly related to homicide rate at state level). The Sallie suggestion
was made by the Solicitor General in his amicus brief in Fouler v. North Carolina, in which his primary
argument was that the death penalty does not violate the eighth amendment. Brief of Solicitor
General at 37- 38, Fowler v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 904 (1976).
1111
 Ehrlich, supra note 96, at 409-10.
1 ' 2 Bailey, supra note 113, at 198; Bechdolt, supra note 119, at 57-64.
1 " C. JAVEVARDENE,
	
PENALTY OF DEATH 10-16 (1977).
16 ' 428 U.S. at 153, 237, n. 14. (1976)
'' See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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D. Retribution
The rationales of deterrence and incapacitation are not sufficient to justify the death
penalty when analyzed under the constitutional right of privacy. The death penalty will
not he justifiable, therefore, unless the third claimed rationale — retribution — is con-
stitutionally sufficient.
True retribution has various attributes. It can be viewed as society's proportional
preordained response to the breach of one of its rules.'" Alternatively, retribution can be
viewed as the normal expression of hate or anger which outrageous conduct arouses in
people.'"
What distinguishes pure retribution from other penological objectives is that it is
wholly a moral response. It lays claim to no utilitarian value whatsoever. The moment that
utilitarian considerations a t e injected, retribution loses its character and becomes but a
species of deterrence. As was previously noted, this transmutation was effected by Justice
Stewart in Gregg v. Georgia.'"" If retribution is the claimed rationale for a particular
punishment, but deterrence is meant, the analysis applicable to the deterrence 'mist he
used for retribution. As demonstrated above, the death penalty cannot pass musttt as a
deterrent under the constitutional scrutiny afforded the rights to privacy and life. The
ultimate question thus becomes whether the community's sense of proportionality and its
expression of outrage — retribution — will alone justify the death penalty. The answer is
that they will not. ln the context of the right to privacy it is not justified because the
concepts of compelling state interest and least restrictive means are by their nature
utilitarian, and are not moral absolutes. Nor is it justified in the context of the right to life,
because this right yields only to necessities of public safety and health, values which also
are purely utilitarian.'""
CONCLUSION
Imposition of capital punishment. by the state must be constitutionally weighed, not
only against the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, but also against the well
defined constitutional rights of privacy and life. Essential to privacy as a constitutional
value is the concept of inviolability of the person, while the right to life is literally an
clement of substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court has concluded that for purposes of the eighth amendment. the state need not prove
that the death penalty serves its legitimate interests or that it has chosen the least severe
penalty necessary to save those interests. In sharp contrast, if the death penalty were
evaluated in terms of' the constitutional right of life and privacy, the burden would he
165 J. Feinberg, "Punishment," in Punishment 2, 8 (J. Feinberg and 1i. Gross eds. 1975).
16T
1 " See .supra note 80 and accompanying text.
"" See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-30 (1905) (right of community to protect itself
against small-pox) invoked public health and safety needs to overcome a person's interest in resisting
compulsory vaccination. At one time it was said that personal rights could he limited in the interest or
public "welfare" or morality, as well. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662-63 (1887). Recent cases
defining the right of privacy make it clear that considerations of public morality alone will not
authorize the limitation (if personal rights. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1973); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1909); See also Flenkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUN ► . L. Rev. 1110,
1431-1432 (1974).
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upon the government to show first that it has a compelling state interest to kill and second,
that no less invasive measure would suffice.
The possible interests the state can claim to support the death penalty are deterrence,
incapacitation, and retribution. An examination of the wealth of relevant data reveals that
the death penalty has not been proven to deter homicide, and that, to the contrary, it may
be a counter-deterrent, that is, a stimulus of murder. Further, the data indicate that the
state would use means less invasive of human rights than the death penalty, to deter
homicide, these means including lengthy prison sentences of convicted murderers, addi-
tional police and prosecutorial resources, and stimulation of the economy to provide
more employment. The death penalty is not required by the interest of incapacitation,
since this purpose would be fully served by the alternative penalty of lengthy prison
sentences. The remaining interest, retribution, when stripped of the trappings of deter-
rence with which it is commonly associated, is simply a moral response, not possessed of
utilitarian value, and therefore not amounting to a necessary or compelling state interest.
While a few courts have passed upon the validity of the death penalty against claims
of rights to privacy and life,'m only the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Com-
monwealth v. O'Neal' fully considered these constitutional challenges and held invalid the
capital punishment law in question. The O'Neal court found that the statute did not
violate the eighth amendment, and then considered independently the rights to privacy
and life.' 72
 The court stated that the right to life is fundamental," and concluded that the
government must demonstrate both a compelling state interest and the absence of means
less restrictive of the rights.' 73 The O'Neal court held that the state had failed to sustain
those burdens." It is submitted that O'Neal is correctly decided for the reasons set forth
in this article. The United States Supreme Court should follow the reasoning in O'Neal,
and condemn the death penalty as an unwarranted deprivation of privacy and life.
I" See supra note 4 and cases cited therein.
ill 367 Mass. 440, 327 N.E.2d 662, reargument of add'? issues. , 369 Mass. 242, 339 N.E.2d 676
(1975).
I72 id,
173 367 Mass. at 449, 327 N.E.2d at 668.
74 367 Mass. at 448, 339 N.E.2d at 667. Subsequently, the Massachusetts legislature re-enacted a
capital punishment provision. Acts 1979, c. 488. This law was invalidated as a cruel, unusual and
arbitrary punishment in District Attorney for Suffolk District v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 650, 411
N.E.2d 1274, 1282-83 (1980), with the court relying iri part on the discussion of right to life in O'Neal.
The voters of Massachusetts amended their constitution on November 2, 1982, to state that "no
provision of the Constitution ... shall be construed as prohibiting the punishment of death." Art.
116 of the Amendment, to the Massachusetts Constitution. The legislature promptly enacted an-
other death penalty law, Acts 1982, c.554, codified as M.G.L. c.279. §§ 57-71. As this article went to
press, the court found the new law to be unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393
Mass. 150, N.E.2d (1984), on account of the impermissible burden cast on the rights of trial by
jury arid against self incrimination by the provision that exempted from the death penalty defen-
dants who pled guilty.
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